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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78A-3-
102(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (2008). The case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78A-4-103(2)(j), Utah Code Ann. (2008). 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal 
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above-captioned action was filed by plaintiff Stevensen 3rd East, L.C. 
("Stevensen") on May 9, 2001. Stevensen claimed damages against defendant Russell K. 
Watts ("Watts") for breach of his duties as the manager of The Club Condominium, L.C. 
('The Club"). [R: 1-36.] The issues were narrowed through numerous motions leading 
up to Trial, none of which motions have been identified as subject to the present appeal 
by Watts. 
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Stevensen's claims were tried before a jury on January 22, 2007 through February 
1, 2007. [R. 7992, 7995-96, 7998-8002, 8080, 8087.] The jury found that Watts breach 
his fiduciary duties owed to Stevensen by a standard of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct and returned a verdict against Watts in the amount of $474,000. [R. 8194-
8195.] Based on Stevensen's motion, the Court made a further award of prejudgment 
interest, attorneys fees and costs and entered final judgment on September 4, 2007. [R: 
8558-8563.] Watts filed a Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2007. [R: 8564-8566.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee has provided a set of detailed fact with references to the record on pages 
25 through 46, below. In order to eliminate unnecessary duplication, said pages are by 
this reference incorporated herein as appellee's statement of facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant has failed to transcribe essential portions of the record. With respect 
to appellant's challenges to the jury instructions, appellant failed to transcribe the hearing 
on jury instructions held September 6, 2006 and November 15, 2006, resulting in the 
order dated November 15, 2006 governing jury instructions. Appellant has also failed to 
marshal the evidence necessary to provide the context with which to measure either 
questions of law or the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court. 
2. Appellant asserts that jury instruction no. 51 was incorrect, because it refers to 
the job in which Watts was engaged as the manager of the company. However, the 
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instruction follows MUJI 7.30, and appellant acknowledges in their own brief on page 10 
that the job in which Watts was engaged was a relevant consideration. Moreover, 
Appellant's own trial witnesses emphasized Watts' extensive qualifications and 
superiority as a developer of real estate. After asking the jury to consider his 
qualifications, Appellant cannot in good faith expect this Court to rule that the Trial 
Court erred in including such a reference in the jury instructions. The jury would have 
considered appellant's profession whether or not it was referenced in the instructions. 
3. Appellant objects to the damages instruction given by the Trial Court without 
acknowledging the damages evidence presented to the jury by appellant's own expert 
witness. Stevensen's expert used exactly the same damages model as appellant's expert. 
The only significant difference in damages testimony presented by the parties was that 
appellant's expert attempted more aggressive advocacy as to what the jury should 
conclude. Appellant's objection concerning the jury instruction has no relevance 
whatsoever to the outcome of the case. In addition, appellant failed to timely submit to 
the Trial Court the jury instruction now requested. 
4. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining 
the scope of testimony by Stevensen's experts. The testimony appellant describes as 
objectionable was both appropriate, because it was relevant, and inconsequential, since 
the expert testimony had no inappropriate impact on the outcome of the case. In addition, 
appellant's only objection at trial was that Stevensen's experts could testify at all. 
Appellant failed at trial to make objection to the specific questions or testimony at issue. 
5. Appellant challenges the findings of the jury. Despite the fact that Stevensen 
filed a brief describing the evidentiary support for the jury's verdict, in response to 
appellant's post-trial motion, appellant has failed to marshal even a fraction of the 
relevant evidence. Appellant offers a string of frivolous arguments which ignore the 
substantial uncontroverted evidence supporting the verdict. Appellant fails to even state 
the law applicable to the jury's finding and, therefore, fails to relate the evidence cited to 
the legal standards in the case. There is overwhelming evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict. 
6. Appellant challenges the award of prejudgment interest without referencing or 
discussing the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 
UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064. The parties briefed the issue for the Trial Court, and appellant is 
aware that Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. is the definitive case on point. 
7. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining 
the appropriate amount of attorney's fees awarded. Even though appellant failed to file a 
timely opposition to the amount of fees requested, the Trial Court nonetheless allowed 
appellant to argue the matter. The Trial Court received supplemental briefing and 
scheduled further oral argument on this point and clearly articulated the basis of its 
determination in accordance with the case law referenced by appellant. Appellant's 
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challenge is frivolous both factually as a matter of law, because (1) appellant incorrectly 
claims that the Trial Court lacked the necessary information to determine a reasonable 
attorney fee, rather than recognizing that the Trial Court was simply of a different 
opinion as to significance of the evidence presented, and (2) the law does not permit 
pfirties to ask the Appellate Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the Trial 
Court where there is an adequate basis for the Trial Court's decision. 
8. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining 
the appropriate amount of costs awarded. Again, the Trial Court received extensive 
briefing and oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the basis of its 
determination. 
9. A frivolous appeal "is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b). Stevensen requests an award of 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to the frivolous appeal in this action. Stevensen 
further requests that the appeal in this action be dismissed without hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO TRANSCRIBE NECESSARY 
HEARINGS AND MARSHAL EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ISSUES OF LAW. 
In order the appeal the Trial Court's determination of which jury instructions to 
apply, appellant had a duty to this Court to transcribe those hearings in which jury , 
instructions were argued. Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, par. 46-48, 102 P.3d 774, 
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786. "Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as 
a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and 
competent evidence." Id., citing Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Hearings on jury instructions were held September 6, 2006 and November 15, 
2006, resulting in the order dated November 15, 2006 governing jury instructions. [R. 
6836, 6965-73.] Appellant has failed to transcribe those hearings. Therefore, appellant's 
issue nos. 1 and 2 concerning jury instructions should not be considered or given a 
hearing before this Court. 
The evidence must even be marshaled where the primary focus of appellant's 
challenge is a legal issue. "Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal 
ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal 
standard is extremely fact sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the 
evidence. See, e.g., [In Re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343] at 1347-49 (explaining that 
failure of the appellant to marshal the evidence meant findings were presumed valid, 
proving fatal to her legal argument)/' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, par 20, 100 P.3d 
1177,1184-85. 
Appellant has discussed its duty to marshal the evidence only relative to its issue 
no. 4, the jury's verdict. Appellant fails to recognize that they also have a duty to 
marshal the fact sensitive details relative to their presentation of appellant's issue nos. 1, 
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2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Decisions which turn on the discretion of the Trial Court or the 
application of the law to a case are not made in a vacuum. Appellant has grossly failed to 
marshal the applicable evidence, placing this Court in a position in which it must 
conclude that the analysis by the Trial Court was correct. Therefore, appellant's issue 
nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 should not be considered or given a hearing before this Court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 51 IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, par. 12 
and 38, 131 P.3d 252, 256 and 262, cited by appellant, 
We examine the challenged instructions in context. See Id. "[I]f the jury 
instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible 
error does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as 
accurate as it might have been." Id. 
To prevail on appeal based on instructions to the jury, this court must find both 
that the instruction was inaccurate and that there is "'not a mere possibility, but a 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.'" (citations omitted.) 
In the present case, jury instruction no. 5 I was an accurate instruction as to the law 
applicable to the case. Appellant cites no case law to support their contention that the 
jury instruction was incorrect. Defendant's cite several cases to support their position 
that the Trial Court was correct in holding that liability had to be proven to the level of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct, but not one of those cases concerns the issue that 
appellant is contesting on appeal.1 
1
 The Trial Court's holding as to the gross negligence standard was error, as the change 
in the applicable standard was adopted by the legislature more than two years after the 
7 
Appellant asserts that jury instruction no. 51 was incorrect, because it refers to the 
job in which Watts was engaged as the manager of the company. However, the 
instruction follows the language of MUJI 7.30 (1993). MUJI 7.30 is a very balanced 
instruction, indicating to the jury that they may consider the skill and learning ordinarily 
possessed by a person in a particular field of employment. However, MUJI 7.30 also 
cautions the jury against holding the person to a standard of exceptional skill or caution, 
and MUJI 7.30 cautions the jury that a person may make errors of judgment, mistakes in 
performance or disagree with others without being negligent. In this case, the Trial Court 
actually modified MUJI 7.30 to create a higher burden of proof for Stevensen, not Watts. 
The Trial Court added that the jury would need to find that Watts' conduct was so bad 
that it constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct. [R. 817211 
The MUJI 7.30 instructions is based on case law that addresses the elements of 
causation and responsibility for causing damage to others in the construction context. 
MUJI 7.30 cites Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co.. 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964). In 
Whitman, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the issues which were incorporated into 
acts alleged and after the date the lawsuit was filed. [R. 6933-43.] Nonetheless, the said 
error is not the subject of appeal, because Stevensen was able to prove his case beyond 
the higher standard of showing gross negligence or willful misconduct by Watts. [R. 
7134-36.] By meeting a burden of proof significantly greater than the burden which 
should have been required, Stevensen has removed any doubt that jury instruction no. 51 
did not improperly affect the outcome of the case. 
The appellate courts will affirm the decision of the lower court if there are any 
sustainable grounds found in the record, even if they were not the grounds applied by the 
trial court and even if they were not raised on appeal or before the lower court. 
Okelberrv v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App. 327, par 11, 120 P.3d 34, 38. 
'The goal of the 'affirm on any ground' rule is judicial economy." Id. 
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MUJI 7.30 and Jury Instruction No. 51 as uthe universally accepted standard of care: that 
of the ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances." Id. at 920. 
Consequently, Jury Instruction No. 51 actually mitigated in favor of Appellant, because it 
cautions the jury not to hold Appellant to a standard of extraordinary skill or caution. 
Even if the amendment suggested by appellant were made, jury instruction no. 36 
already instructed the jury that the standard of care in this case was based on the learning, 
skill and care of builders and developers. [R. 8156.] Appellant made no objection to jury 
instruction no. 36 at trial, and appellant fails to claim it was an error as part of its appeal. 
Addressing the language injury instruction no. 51 would not in any circumstance have 
altered the outcome of the case. 
Moreover, most of the testimony was lay testimony from Walts and his 
employees. Watts and other trial witnesses called by Watts emphasized Watts' 
qualifications and superiority. [R. 8586, pp. 368:16-36:8; 8589, pp. 1014:2-1015:16, 
1076:14-1078:12; 8590 pp. 1183:16-1184:22, 1185:8-10, 1186:14-1187:18, and so forth.] 
Stevensen also presented the testimony of Lynn Larsen as an expert in the field, and 
Appellant chose not to rebut that testimony with a defense expert. Together, the 
testimony presented did nothing more than provide the jury with the "circumstances" 
from which they were to judge Watts' conduct. The jury instruction did not influence the 
jury into thinking that Watts was to be held to some level of conduct higher than uthe 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances." After asking the jury to 
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consider his qualifications, appellant cannot in good faith ask this Court to rule that the 
Trial Court erred in including a reference to his experience and training in the jury 
instructions. 
In order allow this Court to even consider whether a change to the jury instruction 
might have made a difference, the appellant had the obligation to marshal the evidence 
from trial necessary for this Court to determine what those circumstances were or to 
assess whether or not the Trial Court's assessment of the circumstances might have 
involved any error. Without the benefit of the evidence being marshaled by appellant, 
including all the testimony concerning the learning, skill and care of Watts and that 
applicable to the industry, this Court must conclude that the jury would have considered 
appellant's profession whether or not it was referenced in the instructions, and that the 
reference injury instruction no. 51 was of no consequence as a result. 
Where the outcome of a matter was unlikely affected by a detail in a jury 
instruction, even if the ruling of the Trial Court was incorrect, the matter is not an issue 
of reversible error, because there is not a reasonable likelihood that changing the 
instruction would have altered the outcome of the case. See Haupt v. Heaps, supra, at par. 
38. The jury found against Appellant on the grounds that he breached his fiduciary duties 
by a degree of gross negligence or willful misconduct. [R. 8172, 8194.] The evidence 
against Watts was so overwhelming and largely undisputed, as discussed under Argument 
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V, below, even if the jury had not been instructed that they could consider Appellant's 
skill and learning, it would not have changed the outcome. 
Appellant should be aware that their appeal is frivolous. Appellant acknowledges 
in their own brief on page 10 that "a manager's skill and learning may be considered." If 
a manager's skill and learning is a relevant consideration to whether he acted with gross 
negligence or willful misconduct, it is difficult to understand why defendant's have 
appealed the instruction in question - particularly since they cite no case law to support 
their contention. 
Appellant's issue no. 1 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact 
nor warranted by existing law. Due to the failure to even marshal the necessary evidence 
or transcribe the hearings on jury instructions, appellant's brief does not warrant oral 
argument. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 53 IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
As with issue no. 1, above, Jury Instruction No. 53 is an accurate instruction as to 
the law applicable to the case, and addressing the defect alleged by appellant would not in 
any circumstance have altered the outcome of the case. Therefore, there is no reversible 
error. See Haupt v. Heaps, supra. In addition, appellant failed to proffer the proposed 
instruction at the appropriate time as ordered by the Trial Court. Appellant's proposed 
jury instructions simply did not include a requested instruction on the calculation of net 
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profits. [R. 4508.] And again, appellant has failed to marshal the evidence necessary to 
support their allegations of what occurred at trial. 
Jury Instruction No. 53 is based on MUJI 19.16, the damages instruction for 
business torts. MUJI 19.16 cites Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
for its support. For the applicable discussion, see id- at 1006-07. 
The outcome of the case would not have been affected by the instructions 
suggested by the appellant, because the economic expert witnesses of both parties 
actually gave the jury identical description of how they derived their gross income/net 
profit opinions. In the first place, the parties presented identical evidence of gross 
income and expenses, and most of the financial data from appellant's expert was even 
stipulated to by Stevensen's expert simply for purposes of clarity for the sake of the jury. 
[R. 8585, p. 261:5-23; 8587, pp.580:12-581:22, 586:19-22, 588:24-589:13; Exhibits 28, 
29, 97, 762; 8017, 8020, 8041.] Both parties assumed that the gross profit would have 
been identical to the actual amount of gross profit that actually accrued, so there was no 
speculation as to income. Second, both experts presented a net profit calculation by 
subtracting actual expenses incurred as shown on the books of The Club to arrive at an 
actual profit figure. [R. 8587, pp. 581:25-583:2; Exhibits 97and 762; 8020, 8041.] Both 
experts arrived at a potential damages figure by informing the jury what the amount owed 
to Stevensen would be, depending upon what expenses the jury included in the 
accounting based on whether or not it found that Watts had caused certain of those 
12 
expenses by breaching his fiduciary duties. [R. 8587, pp. 584:4-19, 588:15-23, 589:14-
24; 8589, pp. 1158:4-1159:5, 1162:7-1164:9, Exhibits 97 and 762; 8020, 8041.] 
Appellant's expert even agreed on cross examination that given different assumptions 
about which expenses were legitimate (versus unauthorized or otherwise inappropriate), 
his damages figure would be within $30,000 of the figure presented by Stevensen's 
expert. [R. 8589, pp. 1153:1-1155:20.] The result of the presentation of evidence was 
that the jury had only one gross profit figure to use as a starting point. The roll of the 
jury was then to calculate the net profit on the basis of the dispute between the parties 
concerning expenses. The result was a net profit figure. Adding an instruction 
concerning net profit would not have provided any new or unique instruction to the jury. 
Such an instruction would not have aided the jury in any way to reach a decision. An 
additional jury instruction would not in any way have altered the outcome of the case. 
For further discussion of the evidence and why certain expenses were characterized as 
resulting from Watts' breach of fiduciary duty, see Argument V, below. 
Appellant objects to the damages instruction given by the Trial Court without 
marshaling, or even acknowledging, the damages evidence presented to the jury by 
Appellant's own expert witness. Appellant asserts that the jury should have been 
instructed concerning the distinction between gross profits and net profits. However, at 
no time during the course of trial did either party present any evidence that would have 
even permitted the jury to misconstrue the fact that they were being asked to return a 
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verdict on the basis of a net profit calculation. While it is nice that appellant has cited 
cases which refer to circumstances where a gross income/net profit distinction would be 
applicable, appellant has done nothing to demonstrate to this Court that there was actually 
a need for such an instruction in this case. 
Appellant's issue no. 2 is frivolous, because the appeal is not grounded in fact, and 
no change to the instruction is warranted by existing law. The damages instructions 
given were appropriate on the basis of the law and the evidence as introduced at trial. 
Appellant's argument grossly ignores the fact that the jury made a net profit calculation 
and was never presented with any evidence or argument that would have allowed them to 
erroneously make a mistake of the nature that appellant's belatedly suggested jury 
instruction might have addressed. Of course, this may explain why appellant failed to 
timely request such an instruction prior to trial. Again, due to the failure to even marshal 
the necessary evidence or transcribe the hearings on jury instructions, appellant's brief 
does not warrant oral argument. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REFLECT PROPER APPLICATION OF ITS DISCRETION. 
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the 
scope of testimony by Stevensen's experts. The testimony Appellant describes as 
objectionable was both appropriate and inconsequential. The expert testimony had no 
inappropriate impact on the outcome of the case. Appellant has failed to marshal the 
14 
evidence necessary to support its contention that the outcome would have been different 
but for the admission of the testimony. 
In addition, appellant failed to make the objections necessary during trial to 
preserve any right to appeal the admission of such evidence. At trial, appellant stated 
only a general objection to permitting Mr. Larsen to testify at all, which was overruled, 
and then failed to make objection to the specific questions or responses necessary to 
preserve the present issue for appeal. [R. 8584, p. 76:2-19.] Appellant has also failed to 
transcribe the hearing on the relevant motions in limine which was held March 14, 2005, 
which resulted in the order concerning expert testimony dated March 16, 2005. [R. 4017-
44.] 
Appellant claims that the expert testimony was both irrelevant and prejudicial, but 
fails to distinguish the standards applicable on appeal as to issues of relevance and issues 
of prejudice. 
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. 
Evidence may be relevant for one purpose but not for others in the same case. See 
Olympus Hills Center, Ltd. v. Smith Food, 889 P.2d 445, 454-55 (Utah App. 1995). 
Relevance for any purpose will suffice. Id. at 455. In order to prevail on appeal, the 
appellant must demonstrate both that the trial court abused its discretion in determining 
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the evidence was relevant and that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result absent the error. Carlson Distributing v. Salt Lake Brewing, 2004 UT App 227 par. 
26,95 P.3d 1171, 1178. 
With respect to the matter of prejudice, the Court of Appeals stated in Olympus 
Hills, "We review a trial court's determination that evidence is not unfairly prejudicial 
under an abuse of discretion standard and "reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds 
of reasonability."" (cititations omitted.) Olympus Hills, supra, at 455. The evidence 
must have the effect of influencing the jury by improper means, appealing to the jury's 
sympathies, arousing a sense of horror, or provoking the jury to punish. Id. at 455. 
The testimony provided by Stevensen's experts was relevant, but not critical to the 
outcome of the case. See Argument V, below. Its exclusion would not have altered the 
outcome of the case. Such evidence also had no unfairly prejudicial effect, and certainly 
did not exceed the "bounds of reasonability." The fact that the jury found that Watts had 
acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct, but then refrained from awarding 
punitive damages, is a clear indication that the jury was in control of its emotions and 
decision making faculties. 
An examination of appellant's arguments demonstrates no link between the expert 
testimony and any potential error. With regard to the testimony of Mr. Kesler, appellant 
begins on page 14 by stating only two of Mr. Kesler's opinions concerning Mr. Watts' 
conduct. Appellant then abandons that discussion without showing how the opinions 
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were either irrelevant or prejudicial. Instead, on page 15, appellant next cites his own 
cross examination of Mr. Kesler and argues that his cross examination established that 
Mr. Kesler's opinions were unreliable. The cross examination shows that Mr. Kesler did 
not rely on internal bank records to reach his opinion, which is no surprise because Mr. 
Kesler testified that he relied upon the testimony of Mr. Watts and upon the loan 
documents that he did review. Appellant fails to marshal any evidence to address the 
basis for Mr. Kesler's testimony. Appellant then continues on page 15 to conclude that 
Mr. Kesler's testimony was irrelevant, because parties are not legally required to conform 
to industry standards. Appellant tacitly acknowledges that Mr. Watts did not follow 
industry standards, which of course undermines their immediately preceding argument 
that Mr. Kesler's opinion was unreliable. But appellant fails to even discuss the potential 
relevance of Mr. Kesler's opinions to the outcome of the case. For Stevensen's 
discussion of what was relevant in this case, see Argument V., below. 
With regard to the testimony of Mr. Larsen, appellant begins on page 16 by 
addressing only four statements by Mr. Larsen. With regard to the first and second 
statements, while it might be relevant that a cost-plus contract is disfavored because it 
lends itself to abuse or that Mr. Watts favored his father in contracting with him as the 
architect, Stevensen stipulated that it did not claim that the contract was unfair or a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, while the statements were relevant, there could have 
been no prejudice. Appellant does not reference making any motion to strike the 
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testimony or admonish the jury. Therefore no right to appeal the statement was 
preserved. With regard to the third statement, it was relevant that the agreements were 
not managed on an arms-length basis. As appellants acknowledge, Watts was reporting 
only to himself as both the manager of The Club and as the president of the contractor, 
which arrangement made it easy for Watts to engage in self dealing and hide his 
inappropriate actions. In dealing with the architect in particular, Watts purposefully 
excluded the architect from involvement with the financial details of the project, which 
allowed Watts to implement design and finish changes which took the project millions of 
dollars over budget and grossly extended the timeframe for construction. [R. 8584:91:2-
95:25, 110:7-114:9; 8588, pp. 974:22-975:12.] This is the context for Mr. Larsen's 
concern with Watts' violation of industry standards. The construction records showed 
that the project was on budget and being build in accordance with the plans dated June 
20, 1997 though October 1998. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3-981:11; Exhibit 685 (see both draw 
reports and the inspection report bates stamped 2000372-76); 8038] As far as the 
architect knew, the project was on budget and on schedule and he had no idea how the 
matters alleged by Watts could have taken the project millions of dollars over budget and 
delayed completion of the construction by more than one year. [R. 8584, pp. 101:14-
104:13; 8588, pp. 980:3-986:5] With regard to the fourth statement, Mr. Larsen's opinion 
that Watt's intentionally went over budget, enriching his construction company at the 
expense of The Club and Stevensen, is the basis for his contention that under those 
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circumstances, charging interest on the cost overruns was a magnification of the 
wrongdoing of Watts in the first place. 
Appellant fails to marshal the evidence necessary to give this Court the context for 
any of Mr. Larsen's statements. Without the proper context, this Court is not in a 
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position to consider either the relevance of the statements or the potential of any 
inappropriate prejudicial effect. There is no indication that appellant preserved any 
objection with respect to the statements, and there is certainly nothing to show that the 
Trial Court acted "beyond the bounds of reason ability" in determining that the statements 
were not unduly prejudicial. 
Appellant's issue no. 3 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact 
nor warranted by existing law. Appellant asks this Court to assume that appellant's own 
cross examination Mr. Kesler was prejudicial, and that statements of Mr. Larsen 
proffered without any context were at the same time both irrelevant and prejudicial 
"beyond the bounds of reasonability" on the part of the Trial Court. Due to the failure to 
even marshal the necessary evidence, appellant's brief does not warrant oral argument. 
V. APPELLANT FAILS TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE 
THE JURY'S FINDINGS. 
Appellant challenges the findings of the jury. Despite the fact that Stevensen filed 
a brief describing the evidentiary support for the jury's verdict, in response to Appellant's 
post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict [R. 8349-63], appellant has 
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nonetheless failed to marshal the relevant evidence. Appellant offers a string of frivolous 
arguments which ignore the substantial uncontroverted evidence supporting the verdict. 
Appellant also seems to ignore that the jury found Watts liable by a standard of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct for breach of fiduciary duty. By failing to cite to 
any case law which discusses the relevant elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty,~ appellant has not tied a single scrap of evidence to the findings that were made 
with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
A. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE JURY'S FINDINGS. 
Appellant is aware of his failure to marshal the necessary evidence. In footnote 5 
on page 18 of his brief, appellant asks this Court to review the record on its own. 
However, appellant has already acknowledged his marshaling obligation in this case. In 
his Motion to Reconsider Page Limitation, dated August 22, 2008, appellant states: 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan 
Manufacturing Corp., 101 UT 94, par. 21, 54 P.3d 1177, that 
To mount a successful attack upon a trial court's findings of fact, an 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below. 
" Appellants Issue no. 4, encompassing pages 18-55, fails to include any discussion of 
the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. While the argument contains 
scattered citations to case law concerning evidentiary standards, the only citation to a 
case that even mentions breach of fiduciary duty appears on lines 6-8 on page 34, for the 
proposition that failure to disclose is not a breach of fiduciary duty where the plaintiff has 
access to the books of the company. 
20 
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced a trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Neely v. Bennett 202 UT app 189, par 11, 51 P.3d 724 
(emphasis added). See also Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement: 
An Overview, Utah Bar Journal, August/September, 2004, p. 2 ("There are two 
chief requirements that must be satisfied in order to properly fulfill the marshaling 
requirement. First the marshaling should be correctly located, and second, the 
marshaling should be thorough") (emphasis added). "The marshaled facts should 
'correlate to particular items of evidence with the challenged finding, * Majestic, 
818 P.2d at 1315, supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record 
..." Nedy, 2002 UT App 189, par 11 (emphasis added). 
This Court has previously stated that an appellant cannot use the appellate-
brief page limitation to excuse his or her duty to fulfill the marshalling 
requirement. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Our 
insistence on compliance with the marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting 
hypertechnical adherence to form over substance.") ... 
As discussed below, appellant's issue no. 4 is structured as a straw man argument, 
completely ignoring the need to 1) thoroughly and completely marshal the relevant 
evidence, 2) construe the evidence in the light supporting the verdict, and 3) then identify 
any deficiency in the evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Chen v. Stewart, supra, 2004 UT 82, par 
77-78, 100 P.3d at 1195, as follows: 
What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they presented in the 
trial court. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different from that of presenting 
the evidence at trial. The challenging party must "temporarily remove its own 
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position"; he or she must play the 
"devil's advocate." Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, % 19, 57 P.3d 1093. In so doing, 
appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, 
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Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998), and not attempt 
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. In re Estate of Bartell, 
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Appellants cannot merely present carefully 
selected facts and excerpts from the record in support of their position. Oneida, 
872 P.2d at 1053. Nor can they simply restate or review evidence that points to an 
alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact. Wilson 
Supply, 2002 UT 94 at If 22. 
The Utah Supreme Court further explained that "an appellee need only point to a scintilla 
of evidence that supports a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim of no 
evidence." Id. at par 82. 
In the present case, appellants have failed marshal even a fraction of the evidence 
and have failed to present the evidence to this Court in the manner required for an appeal. 
That failure by itself is grounds for dismissal of the appeal. See Chen, supra, at par. 74. 
Stevensen need only present a scintilla of evidence to refute the appeal at issue. 
B. STEVENSEN EASILY MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL. 
Before examining all of the limited evidence and conclusory statements presented 
in appellant's brief, it is important to understand Stevensen's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty and the law applicable to the claim. Appellant's brief fails to include any 
discussion of the breach of fiduciary duty, its elements, how the evidence relates to each 
of those elements, or the burden of proof. Appellant does not challenge jury instruction 
no. 46, which defined fiduciary duty as including "the duties of good faith, honesty, 
loyalty and due care." [R. 8166-67.] See also 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 
1460 (2004). Further instructions concerning the duties of the appellant are contained in 
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jury instruction nos. 47, 48, 49, 50, none of which were challenged by the appellant either 
at trial or on appeal. [R.8168-71.] Those instructions informed the jury that Watts had 
duties of care, loyalty, honesty and good faith. In addition, the Trial Court should have 
provided other instructions to the jury concerning appellant's duties and potential 
liability/ The verdict of the jury must be sustained on any of those grounds if there is 
3
 The Trial Court placed the burden of proof on Stevensen to show that Watts breached 
his fiduciary duties. In fact, the jury should have been instructed that Watts had the 
burden of establishing that he met his fiduciary duties in a variety of contexts. 
See Bradbury v. Rasmusen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 fn. 4 (Utah 1965) (If a confidential 
relationship exists by which the person in a superior position benefits, "a presumption 
arises that the transaction was unfair; this presumption has the force of evidence and will 
itself support a finding if not overcome by countervailing evidence. The burden is on the 
superior party ..."). 
The manager must maintain true and correct books showing the company's 
accounts. In a fiduciary capacity, the manager has the burden of showing that he met his 
obligation with respect thereto, and all doubts are to be resolved against him. Couri v. 
Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (111. App. 1983). "The duty of full disclosure required for a 
partner to overcome the breach of fiduciary duty is especially great when the breaching 
partner is experienced in business compared to the nonbreaching partner. 59A Am. Jur. 
2d, Partnership, section 285 (2003). 
59A Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, section 397 (2003) provides, 
A managing partner has the burden of proving his or her innocence where there is 
a question of his or her compliance with fiduciary duties to the partnership or other 
partners. As the dominant party in a partnership relationship, a managing partner 
faces a presumption of fraud or undue influence when he or she gains a benefit 
from his or her fiduciary relationship with copartners, and he or she can over come 
the presumption only by clear and convincing proof that he or she acted with faith, 
honesty in fact, and full and fair disclosure of relevant information. 
When a company officer is responsible for the administration of an agreement 
between himself and the company, the officer has the burden of showing his good faith 
and fair dealing. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 
1995); Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d, 755, 760 (111. 1983). In a closely held company or 
one in which one party hold a position as the sole manager, such as the present case, 
utmost good faith and loyalty are required. 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460 
(2004). The heightened duty of good faith and loyalty means that a manager must dispel 
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evidence in the record which would have supported a finding of liability. See Okelberry 
v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App. 327, par 11, 120 P.3d 34, 38. 
With regard to the standard of willfulness or gross negligence, the evidence 
supports the jury's determination that Watts' wrongful acts were done willfully or with 
gross negligence. At least three defense witnesses ended their testimony by describing 
how skillful and attentive Watts was in the performance of his duties as the manager of 
the construction project. [R. 8589, pp. 1014:2-1015:16, 1076:14-1078:12; 8590 pp. 
1183:16-1184:22, 1185:8-10, 1186:14-1187:18, and so forth.] From that testimony, the 
jury could have concluded that Watts knew exactly what he was doing and that he acted 
willfully when he did the things that the jury determined gave rise to Watts' breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
There are several scenarios which support the jury's finding of liability, several of 
which scenarios are based upon evidence that is undisputed. Defendant's motion must be 
denied if the court finds sufficient evidence to support even one instance in which Watts 
all doubts concerning his or her conduct, and that if he is unable to carry that burden, all 
doubts, will ordinarily be resolved against him. 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections 
280-81 (2003). The burden on a manager of a closely held company is in addition to the 
burden imposed on an officer or manager engaged in self dealing. 59A Am.Jur. 2d, 
Partnership, section 397 (2003) also provides, 
A managing partner has the burden of proving his or her innocence where there is 
a question of his or her compliance with fiduciary duties to the partnership or other 
partners. As the dominant party in a partnership relationship, a managing partner 
faces a presumption of fraud or undue influence when he or she gains a benefit 
from his or her fiduciary relationship with copartners, and he or she can over come 
the presumption only by clear and convincing proof that he or she acted with faith, 
honesty in fact, and full and fair disclosure of relevant information. 
24 
breached either the fiduciary duty of a care, loyalty, honesty or good faith. The evidence 
was overwhelming that Watts breached all of the fiduciary duties owed to Stevensen. 
1. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Care. 
The law requires a manager to use the ordinary skill and diligence expected in the 
construction industry to benefit the company and increase its profits.4 The evidence 
established that Watts breached the Duty of Care he owed as the manager of the Club, 
including but not limited to the following facts: 
1. Construction industry standards require that for a project of the nature of The 
Club a construction budget and design be established at the beginning of the construction 
project and that thereafter variations to the cost be minimized to ensure that the project is 
completed within the available budget. [R. 8584, pp. 81:22-83:8, 106:14-108:14.] 
Construction industry standards also require oversight by an architect or similar 
professional, to ensure that the contractor proceeds with construction on time and 
consistent with the budget for the project. [R. 8584, pp. 85:22-86:13, 93:13-96:1, 
100:23-101:23.] Industry standards also protect the interests of the owner through 
4 xx
 Directors and officers are obligated to use their ingenuity, influence, and energy, 
and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the property 
and earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are in 
conflict with their own personal interests." C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 
P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 1995). See also 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections 280, 395 
(2003). 
For a discussion of the applicable industry standards see references to the expert 
testimony of Lynn Larsen and Henry Kesler. Again, appellant does not challenge jury 
instruction no. 36, which identifies the fact that industry standards are relevant to the 
duties imposed on appellant. [R. 8156.] 
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contract provisions. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3.] Stevensen as a member of The Club was 
entitled under industry standards to the protection of paragraphs 4.1 and 6.1 of the 
Operating Agreement of The Club, paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 16.1.7 of the contract between 
The Club and Watts Construction, section 2.6 of the contract between The Club and the 
architect; and provisions in the loan documents also prohibited a change in the 
construction budget and required timely completion. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3; Exhibits 4, 
10, 11, 18 and 685; 8016 and 8038.] Paragraph 16.1.7 of the construction contract, in 
particular, references the June 25, 1997 budget, which would have been given to the bank 
before the construction loan of July 11, 1997 was authorized, and the bank's construction 
draw records verify that the amount payable to Watts Corporation on the project totaled 
$5,171,500. [R. Exhibits 10 (last page) and 6855; 8016 and 8038.] Even Watts testified 
that there was a contractual obligation to complete construction no later than November 
1998. [R. 8590, p. 1311:7-12.] As the manager of The Club, Watts was the person 
responsible for enforcement of the construction contract with Watts Corporation. [R. 
8590, p. 1315:4-7, 17-20.] The Operating Agreement of the Club prohibited Watts from 
changing the design or the budget for the project without written authorization from 
Stevensen, which was never given. [R. Exhibit 4, paragraphs 4.1 last sentence and 6.1 
(page 3, bates stamped 101074); 8016.] 
5
 Numerous copies of the bank budget appear in Exhibit 685, such as pages bates 
stamped 200075-76, which provide that the construction costs on lines 2015-9600 plus 
the 8% construction fee total $4,984,000, together with the asbestos and demolition costs 
of $187,500 making the total amount budgeted to Watts Corporation $5,171,500. 
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2. The industry standards are based on the fact that any change in the budget 
creates two risks that are relevant to the interests of the owner, which the relevant 
contract provisions are also designed to protect the owner against. [R. 8584, pp. 95:11-
96:1, 101:14-104:13, 106:14-108:14.] First, an increase in the budget created a risk that 
the project would run out of construction funds. The loan from the bank was sufficient to 
ensure the completion of the project with construction costs of $5,171,500 as represented 
to the bank. [R. Exhibits 16, 18 and 685; 8016 and 8038.] Watts Corporation exceeded 
its budget by a full 50%, exceeding the amount allocated for constructions costs by the 
budget by $2,775,907 and charging construction costs of $7,939,407 as of May 31, 2000. 
[R. 8587, p. 586:11-12; Exhibits 54 (last page) and 97 (Exhibit C); 8018, 8020.] Second, 
any redesign associated with a change in the budget created a risk that completion of the 
construction would be delayed, and, in fact, there was a significant delay resulting from 
the failure to follow industry standards. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3, 101:18-104:13.] The 
bank inspector noted the delay in October 1998 and recommended restricting the loan to 
protect the bank against the delay. [R. 8590, p. 1312:15-23; Exhibit 685 (pages bates 
stamped 200372-76).] 
3. Watts was aware of the risks. [R. 8590, pp. 1273:22-1274:1.] Watts 
intentionally borrowed less than the amount needed to complete the construction. [R. 
8585, pp. 249:4-13, 250:3-11; 8586, pp. 535:21-536:3; 8590, p. 1324:18-19; 8996 and 
8998.] The charges in excess of the budget caused the construction to run out of money 
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ill October 1998 when approximately $3,800,000 to 4,200,000 of the $7,939,407 
ultimately charged by the Watts Corporation had been paid. [R. 8590, pp. 1302:24-
1304:10, 1335:8-11; Exhibits 97 (Exhibit C) and 685 (page bates stamped 200370 shows 
that construction costs were disbursed 81% right before the bank's inspection report, 
which is pages bates stamped 200372-76. Of the $5,175,000 budgeted to construction 
costs, 81% is approximately $4,200,000); R. 8038, 8993.] As a result, the bank placed a 
limit on further disbursements for construction, even though there was actually $465,538 
that was never disbursed of the $5,520,000 originally borrowed. [R. 8585, pp. 266:14-
267:14, 268:1-14; 8590, pp. 1300:14-18, 1301:12-24; Exhibit 13; 8017.] Even though 
the construction could have been completed within budget by the end of 1998, Watts 
began making design changes at that time which increased the cost and delayed 
completion of construction. [R. 8585, pp. 195:16-198:7; 8590, pp. 1304:12-21; Exhibit 
76; 8019.] The construction was completed behind schedule by between 8 and 12 
months, bringing total interest charges and fees for loan extensions to the Club up to 
$1,046,978, nearly $750,000 greater than the October 1997 budget. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-
93:3, 94:18-25; 8589, p. 15-22; Exhibits 22, 70 (second page), 97 (Exhibit D) and 762 ; 
8017, 8019-20 and 8041.] 
4. Mr. Larsen testified that Watts did not comply with industry standards 
requiring (1) that he build from a fixed plan and fixed budget, (2) that an architect or 
similar professional monitor the construction to ensure that it remained within the design 
28 
and budget parameters, and (3) that he honor the contractual terms governing 
construction. [R. 8584, pp. 86:25-87:6,91:2-93:3, 100:23-101:23, 110:7-114:9.] The 
architect, Johnathan Dazley, was instructed not to monitor the conformance of the work 
to the budget, despite the critical role of the architect in ensuring timely performance of 
construction within budget. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-95:25; 8588, pp. 974:22-975:12; 8590:5-
11.] Watts received the bank inspector's report in October 1998, informing him that the 
bank was taking action to limit the construction loan because construction was behind 
schedule. [R. 8590, p. 1312:15-25.] Watts ignored his responsibilities as the manager of 
The Club to enforce the contract with the architect and with Watts Corporation or to 
otherwise ensure that the construction was completed on time and within an appropriate 
budget. Watts testified that he continued making changes as the project went forward. 
[R. 8586, p. 377:7-21.] 
5. The construction project did not run out of money and time until approximately 
October 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 270:20-271:9; 8586, p. 391:7-22.] Johnathan Dazely 
testified that as of October 1998, the construction had been built in accordance with the 
1997 construction drawings. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3-981:11.] The draw reports and the audit 
report prepared by the bank's representative in October 1998 also showed that the 
construction was within $110,000 the parameters of the $5, 171,500 construction budget 
represented to the bank. [R. 8590, pp. 1304:12-21; Exhibit 685 (see the audit report bates 
stamped 200372-76, and the draw reports throughout the exhibit, such as pages bates 
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stamped 200369-70); 8038.] Mr. Larsen also testified that the condominiums could have 
been completed for a grand opening of October 17, 1998 if not for design changes that 
occurred after August 4, 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 195:16-198:7; Exhibit 76; 8019.] Watts 
testified that as late as September 17, 1998, they had been planning on a grand opening in 
November 1998. [R. 8586, pp. 393:10-20.] However, at that time the bank noted that the 
construction was behind schedule, and steps were taken to restriction the construction 
loan as a result, and the bank informed Watts thereof. [R. 8585, pp. 266:14-267:14, 
268:1-13; 8590, p. 1312:15-25.] However it was only after October 1998 that the finish 
work began, and changes in the finish detail were the only factors that Watts ever 
identified as being the cause for the project not being completed on time or on budget. 
[R. 8590, p. 1321:17-23.] In other words, the design changes made by Watts in violation 
of his duty of care were made AFTER the project had run out of money and AFTER the 
construction was out of time per the construction contract and the loan agreement with 
the bank, even though the project could have been completed very nearly on time and on 
budget. [R. 8590, p. 1324:3-1325:24.] The design changes made after that critical 
juncture virtually guaranteed losses to The Club based on the late fees and interest 
charged by the bank and by Watts Corporation. .[R. 8585, pp. 181:25-198:7: 8586, pp. 
391:7-22,535:21-536:3,8994.] 
6. Mr. Larsen also testified that design changes after subcontractors had been 
engaged to perform the work were more costly, that there was no evidence that any 
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design change actually contributed to an increase in the sale price of any unit, and many 
other matters demonstrating that Watts' actions as the manager of The Club were the 
proximate cause of the financial losses suffered by Stevensen. [R. 8584, pp. 106:14-
109:16; 8585, p. 182:14-198:7.] 
2. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Loyalty. 
The law prohibits a manager from placing his own interests above the interests of 
the company. His loyalty must be to the company he serves.6 The evidence established 
that Watts breached the Duty of Loyalty he owed as the manager of the Club, including 
but not limited to the following facts: 
1. The payments of money to Watts Corporation and other Watts' businesses were 
fixed by a budget authorized by Stevensen. Watts was required by contract, and also 
required by the duty of loyalty, to perform his duties for the agreed amount of money. 
(See discussion of contract terms, above.) [R. Exhibits 4, 10, 11, 18 and 685; 8016 and 
8038.] 
6
 The fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty, required Watts to honor contract terms, 
such as the provisions of the Operating Agreement and the March Agreement which 
defined the interests of both Watts and Stevensen. See Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d 
755, 759 (111. 1983); 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460, 1468 (2004). A 
manager has an obligation to conduct the affairs of the company in such a manner as to 
avoid damage to the interests of the members of the company, or damage to the 
company's interests. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., supra, at 54 (Utah 
App. 1995). 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections 280, 395 (2003). "In an effort to 
assure that corporate directors5 acts are fair, just and equitable to all of the stockholders 
courts have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy which minimizes the 
temptation of officers of corporation to prefer their own interests rather than those of the 
corporation and the shareholders." Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982). 
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2. Because of his position of trust as a fiduciary, Watts was prohibited from 
performing in a manner that might create an added risk or otherwise cause Stevensen to 
lose money while payments to Watts Corporation or other Watts businesses were 
increased above the agreed payment amount. In obtaining authorization from Stevensen 
for any increase in the budget, the duty of loyalty required Watts to (a) fully disclose the 
risk to Stevensen and (b) ensure that the change was also fair to Stevensen. [See footnote 
6 ] 
3. Watts was aware that his decision to increase the budget for finish details 
would benefit his company Watts Corporation by adding significant additional profit. [R. 
8590, pp. 1334:24-1335:7; 1361:16-1364:2.] Earning additional profit for The Club, on 
the other hand, was never a factor that Watts considered when increasing the budget or 
making changes to the finish. [R. 8586, pp. 364:13-365:20.] Watts caused Watts 
Corporation to breach its contract with The Club and charge The Club for budget and 
design changes that resulted in an increase in payment of money to Watts Corporation 
and created additional risk and loss to Stevensen, without any corresponding potential 
benefit to Stevensen. [R. 8585, pp. 184:10-190:14; 8586, pp. 365:6-367:1, 372:4-11; 
8994.] Watts Corporation billed the Club $2,775,907 more that the budget to which the 
condominiums were built. [See footnote 5. R. 8585, pp. 188:19-191:14; R. 8587, p. 
586:11-12; Exhibits 54 (last page), 97 (Exhibit C) and 685; 8018, 8020 and 8038.] Watts 
failed to obtain valid authorization, because (a) he failed to fully disclose the nature of the 
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risk to Stevensen and/or (b) the changes were not fair to Stevensen based on the fact that 
potential benefit was accruing solely to Watts' interest and without any potential for 
benefit to Stevensen, as discussed throughout Argument V.B. [R. 8587, pp. 617:12-
69:18.] Watts provided no updates to Stevensen with respect to the changes in projected 
costs and income between October 1997 and 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 256:15-257:8; Exhibit 
23; 8017.] Watts subsequently provided no updates to Stevensen with respect to changes 
in projected costs and income between October 1998 and September 1999. [R. 8585, p. 
313:11-21; 8587, p. 617:18-618:4; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20; Exhibit 24; 8017.] 
4. Watts was also aware that increasing construction costs after October 1998, at a 
time when The Club was unable to pay Watts Corporation, would result in significant 
interest charges from Watts Corporation to The Club. [R. 8590, pp. 1335:8-20.] There 
was no corresponding benefit to The Club in incurring additional interest charges, 
whether it was being paid to Watts Corporation or a third party. Watts, in fact, 
significantly increased the costs of construction between October 1998 and September 
1999 without even disclosing the changes or the risks he was taking to Stevensen. [R. 
8584, pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17; 174:10-17; 8586, pp. 374:7-375:6, 411:11-
417:2; 8587, pp. 617:12-619:5; Exhibits 23 and 24; 8017.] The revised budget which 
Watts finally disclosed after the end of the intervening year showed that construction 
costs to Watts Corporation had risen to $7,246,000, that interest had risen to $528,000, 
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and that the profit to the project had vanished. [R. 8585, pp. 258:8-259:10; Exhibits 23 
and 24; 8017.] It ultimately rose to $7,939,407. [R. Exhibit 97 (Exhibit C); 8020.] 
5. In dealing with the Watts Group, Watts caused The Club to pay $374,740 in 
advertising expenses on top of the real estate commissions that were paid to the Watts 
Group. [R. Exhibits 84-86, 88-93, 97 and 762; 8020 and 8041.] Defendants' own expert 
testified that at the commission rate being paid to the Watts Group, other real estate 
agents would have paid a substantial amount of the advertising expenses. [R. 8588, pp. 
809:2-811:25.] Watts and Stevensen agreed upon the commission paid to the Watts 
Group, but Watts made no disclosure to Stevensen and obtained no consent for payment 
of $374,740 in advertising without any contribution from the Watts Group. [R. 8587. pp. 
623:14-624:16; Exhibit 7; 8016.] Watts even testified that Watts Group was supposed to 
be responsible for all marketing. [8585, p. 306:22-23.] 
3. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Honesty. 
The law requires that a manager be truthful and disclose all information that is 
relevant to the manager's dealings with the members of the company.7 The evidence 
7
 The fiduciary duty of honesty required Watts to make a true and full disclosure of all 
information affecting the affairs of the company. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, 
Inc., supra at 54. "The duty of candor, integral to fair dealing, also dictates that 
fiduciaries, corporate or otherwise, may not use superior information or knowledge to 
mislead others in the performance of their own fiduciary obligations. Thus, while 
occupying a fiduciary relationship, the officer and directors of a corporation are 
precluded from receiving any personal advantage without the fullest disclosure to, and 
assent of, all concerned." 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1485 (2004). 59A 
Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, section 283 (2003) also provides: 
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established that Watts breached the Duty of Honesty he owed as the manager of the Club, 
including but not limited to the following facts: 
1. Watts intended to violate the applicable industry standards as early as 1997, 
because (a) he purposefully borrowed insufficient funds for the completion of the Club 
condominiums at the cost for construction of $6,700,000 that he intended to spend; and 
(b) he falsely informed the bank that he intended to spend only $5,102,000 on 
construction costs. [R. 8585, pp. 249:4-13, 250:3-11; 8586, pp. 405:10-407:5; 8590, pp. 
1296:7-12, 1296:25-1297:20, 1324:18-19; Exhibits 685; 8038, 8996 and 8998.] 
According to the architect and the individual hired by the bank to inspect the progress of 
construction, the design changes were not implemented prior to October 1998. [R. 8588, 
pp. 980:3-981:11; 8590, p. 1312:15-23; Exhibit 685 (pages bates stamped 200372-76).] 
Given the fact that the construction was not on track to be completed on time, design 
changes that would increase the budget and delay construction after October 1998 were 
no longer justified or even prudent. [R. 8590, p. 1324:3-1325:24.] Yet, Watts failed to 
provide truthful information to Stevensen with respect to any aspect of the problems with 
the construction. Instead, Watts consistently gave Stevensen the same false information 
In dealing between partners with regard to fiduciary duties, a partner has no duty 
to use any means to discover a fraud perpetrated against him or her by another 
partner, or to make any investigation of the truth or falsity of representations made 
to him or her by another partner, particularly in face of evidence sustaining an 
implied finding that the misrepresenting partner has superior knowledge with 
respect to business matters. The fiduciary relation between partners may entitle 
one to rely on the opinions, predications, or promises of the other under 
circumstances that would not constitute misrepresentation as between parties 
dealing at arms length. 
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that Watts was giving to the bank. [R. 8585, p. 251:14-25; 8586, p. 373:15-23; 8590, p. 
1291:5-8; Exhibits 21, 441 and 685; 8017, 8027 and 8038.] Watts acknowledged that 
Stevensen would not be able to determine from the information being provided by Watts 
whether or not the project was on budget. [R. 8586, pp. 374:7-375:6.] 
2. In October 1998, Watts Corporation was in breach of its construction 
agreement as a result of the failure to complete the construction on time. [R. 8586, pp. 
407:6-409:15.] Watts did not enforce the rights of the Club relative to the breach of the 
Watts Corporation or inform Stevensen that Watts Corporation was in breach. [R. 8584, 
pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17; 174:10-17; 8586, pp. 411:11-417:2; 8587, pp. 617:12-
619:5.] 
3. In October 1998, the construction project ran out of money and could not pay 
its debts to Watts Corporation. [R. 8585, pp. 269:3-271:9; 8590, p. 1335:8-11.] No 
design changes to the finish detail had been built by that time. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3-
981:11; Exhibit 685; 8038.] Watts did not inform Stevensen that money could be saved 
or risk reduced by foregoing the alleged design changes, if any. [R. ; 8587, p. 618:12-17.] 
4. Beginning in September 1996 and ending in September 1999, Watts told 
Stevensen that the project would earn a profit of $800,000, without ever disclosing to 
Stevensen that there was a risk to that profit arising from the Watts Corporation's failure 
to adhere to the construction schedule or the construction budget. [R. ; 8587, p. 617:18-
618:4; Exhibits 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 54 (last page); 8016-18.] Watts acknowledged that 
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in his discussions with Stevensen about the cost-plus aspect of the project, he always 
gave Stevensen the up-side potential and never discussed with him the down-side risks. 
[R. 8586, p. 421:13-19.] Watts also acknowledged that he did not inform Stevensen of 
the interest that would be charged by Watts Corporation. [R. 8586, p. 422:15-19.] 
5. Watts continued to increase the budget, primarily through design changes that 
occurred between November 1998 and September 1999, without providing Stevensen 
with truthful information with respect thereto. [R. 8585, p. 313:11-21; 8587, p. 617:18-
618:4; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20; Exhibits 23 and 24; 8017.] Lynn Larsen testified that 
because of a lack of plans and set bids for either the original plans or the changes as they 
occurred, Watts lacked sufficient information to even know how far over budget he was 
going as he engage in ongoing redesign. [R. 8584, pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17.] 
Yet, Watts continued to represent to Stevensen that he was on budget even long after he 
knew he was well over the budget represented. [R. 8587, p. 617:18-619:18.] Even Watts 
testified that until September 1999, Watts consistently told Stevensen that he was 
projecting an $800,000 profit in addition to full payment of $770,000 for the land 
contributed by Stevensen. [R. 8590, pp. 1327:10-20.] Incredibily, Watts even 
represented to Stevensen in March 1999 that Watts was projecting selling all 47 units by 
June 1999. [8586, pp. 432:17-433:10; Exhibit 51; 8018.] 
6. Lynn Larsen testified that Watts took no action to adhere to any budget or time 
limit at any time during the process of completing the construction, despite the fact that 
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he could have at any time stopped redesigning and adhered to a fixed budget and timeline 
to complete the construction in accord with the existing plans. [R. 8584, pp. 107:25-
108:17.] 
7. The first time that Watts ever told Stevensen that the profit to the project was at 
risk was in September 1999, after the construction was complete and there was not longer 
anything Stevensen could say or do. [R. 8587, p. 617:18-619:18; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20; 
Exhibit 24; 8017.] When Stevensen objected, Watts immediately refused to have 
anything further to do with Stevensen, even though Stevensen never did anything to harm 
the project in any way. [R. 8585, pp. 315:16-319:9.] 
4. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Good Faith. 
The law prohibits a manager from doing anything that would tend to deprive the 
company and its members of the expectations created by the relationship they have with 
the manager.8 The evidence established that Watts breached the Duty of Good Faith he 
owed as the manager of the Club based on the following facts: 
1. The Duty of Good Faith prohibited Watts using his position as the manager of 
the Club from doing anything that would tend to depri\e Stevensen of his rightful 
expectations to receive repayment for the land he invested, payment of Stevensen's share 
8
 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460 (2004); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 
820 F. Supp 1359, 1366 (D. Utah 1993). The Court in Resolution Trust stated, "the 
director's fiduciary duty of loyalty and the requirement of good faith may not be 
eliminated or limited." Id. at 1366 
See also footnote 5, above. 
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of profit from the project, and payment of the 1% fee due under the March 25, 1999 
agreement. [R. Exhibit 7; 8016.J 
2. Stevensen had a right to expect that Watts would cause Watts Corporation to 
adhere to an authorized construction budget. Stevensen's right to expect adherence to a 
budget was created by the fact that references to a budget were contained in paragraph 
4.1 of the Operating Agreement, paragraph 16.1.7 of the construction agreement with 
Watts Corporation, and the construction draw reports given to Stevensen by Watts on an 
ongoing basis. [R. 8590, pp. 1291:5-8; Exhibits 4, 10, 19-24; 8016-17.] The budget was 
also agreed upon with the bank, and construction draws reports showed that the bank at 
all times believed that the condominiums were being built within the budget represented 
and included as part of the loan documents. [R. Exhibit 685; 8038.] 
3. The parties agreed that Watts would ultimately receive a single fee for the 
construction, consisting of the 8% payment to Watts Corporation for building the 
condominiums. [R. 8587, pp. 627:8-628:11; Exhibits 4 (paragraph 7.1 on page 4) and 7, 
(paragraph 9); 8016.] However, Watts misconstrued the written agreements and claimed 
payment of an 18% fee, by paying his companies both the 8% fee due to the Watts 
Corporation and an additional $451,000 fee. [R. 8590, p. 1361:16-23.] Watts 
acknowledged at trial that the language of Exhibit 7 did not provide for payment of any 
fee other than the fee payable to Watts Corporation. [R. 8586, pp. 436:13-437:21.] When 
there appeared to still be money left in the budget to go to Stevensen, Watts billed the 
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$451,000 fee a second time. [R. 8589, pp. 1148:11-13. 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:3-
1368:14.] 
4. In September 1999, the proforma budget prepared by Watts as the manager of 
the Club showed a profit of only $50,000, but still showed $770,000 in the budget for 
payment for Stevesen's land. [R. Exhibit 24; 8017.] As late as July 2000, Stevensen's 
capital account balance was still at least $367,729 according to Watts' own accountants. 
[R. 8589, p. 1141:5-2; Exhibit 54 (second page); 8018.] It would have required 
additional losses of $721,000 before Stevensen would not be entitled to additional 
payment based on his capital account. [R. 8589, pp. 1141:25-1143:19.] However, Watts 
caused the Club to stop making any payments to Stevensen years before even a fraction 
of such losses were realized. Even as late as 2002, Watts' accountants showed Stevensen 
with a capital account of $149,058. [R. 8589, p. 1150:14-20.] When payment of the 1% 
fees were due upon closing of unit sales, Watts made payments to Watts Group and Watts 
Corporation, but refused to make payment to Stevensen. [R. 8585, p. 316:11-22; 8590, 
pp. 1344:21-1346:3; Exhibit 728; 4023-27 and 8040.] When repayment for land was due 
under the March 25, 1999 agreement, Watts made payments to Watts Corporation, but 
refused to make payment to Stevensen. [R. 8586, pp. 366:10-367:1; 8590, pp. 1344:21-
1346:3; Exhibit 7; 8016.] 
5. Watts used his position as the manager of the Club to cause Watts Corporation 
to exceed the authorized budget and delay the construction of the Club condominiums in 
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order to build condominiums that would generate more construction fees and interest for 
the Watts Corporation and build the reputation of Watts, without any corresponding 
potential benefit to Stevensen. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3, 101:18-104:13, 106:14-109:16; 
8585, pp. 149:6-20, 184:10-190:14; 8586, pp. 364:13-367:1, 372:4-11; Exhibits 23 and 
24; 8017 and 8994.] The actions of Watts were the reason that the September 1999 
budget prepared by Watts showed the absence of a profit. [R. Exhibit 24; 8017. J 
However, rather than requiring his own company to accept even the slightest 
responsibility for causing the loss of profit, Watts decided to require Stevensen to 
shoulder the loss of all profit and the loss of the value of the land he had invested. [R. 
8586, pp. 366:3-367:1.] In addition, Watts caused Watts Corporation to continue to 
exacerbate it breach of the construction agreement by further increasing its charges to the 
Club by more than $500,000 over the budget represented in September 1999 and then 
charging interest on the money that The Club was unable to pay to Watts Corporation. 
LR. Exhibits 24, 97 (Exhibit C) and 762; 8017, 8020 and 8041.] 
6. After September 1999, Watts continued to act in bad faith, further disregarding 
the rights of Stevensen. Watts Corporation was already in serious breach of its 
construction agreement. Stevensen had made an objection to the overbudget spending 
caused by Watts. [R. 8585, pp 315:16-319:9; 8587, pp. 628:21-630:18.] Stevensen's 
objections were not only ignored, Watts actually turned Stevensen's objections into an 
excuse to disregard the rights of Stevesen altogether. [R. 8585, pp. 316:11-22; 8586, pp. 
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366:10-367:1; 8587, pp. 628:21-631:13, 632:11-18; 8590, pp. 1344:21-1346:3.] Watts 
had no basis upon which to assert that the Club would lose enough additional money 
before all of the units were sold to eliminate the equity represented by the land and 
development fee stated in the budget or the balance owing to Stevensen in his capital 
account, because even as late as 2002, three years later, Watts' own accountants were 
showing a positive capital account balance for Stevensen. [R. 8589, p. 1150:14-24; 
Exhibit 54 (second page); 8018.] 
7. Even though money was in the budget and in the capital account, Watts refused 
to make payment of fees as they were due. Those fees represented sales commissions, 
not draws against profits. [R. Exhibits 7 and 728; 4023-27, 8016 and 8040.] Thus, they 
were due on the same basis as the commissions paid to Watts Group. The Club was not 
entitled to claim an offset against losses that the company had not even accrued as of 
September 1999. 
8. Watts refused to make payment beginning in September 1999 out of malice 
and an intent to injure Stevensen. In an attempt to eliminate the potential for any profit or 
return of capital to Stevensen after September 1999, Watts caused Watts Corporation to 
bill the Club for more than $500,000 in further additional unauthorized construction costs 
and charged interest thereon. Even though the construction was complete in September 
1999 and he was reporting construction expenses of only of $7,246,000, Watts ultimately 
caused the Watts Corporation to charge the Club $7,939,407 for construction costs and an 
42 
additional $330,000 in interest purely in reflection of his design to steal all of the 
Stevensen profit on the project. [R. Exhibits 24, 97 (Exhibit C) and 762; 8017, 8020 and 
8041.] Even when that was not enough to eliminate the balance left in Stevensen's capital 
account, Watts refused to make payment of any money due to Stevensen. In 2002, Watts 
double billed a development fee of $451,000 to The Club in a further effort to embezzle 
the money payable to Stevensen. [R. 8589, pp. 1148:11-13, 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:3-
1368:14.] 
5. The Evidence Supports the Finding of Damages. 
Both plaintiff and defendants employed individual economic experts to provide 
financial information to the jury. The jury could have used the financial data from either 
expert, together with various exhibits containing financial data, to arrive at the verdict of 
$474,000 in damages against Watts. The jury employed simple addition and subtraction 
to calculate their verdict. Examples of the various factors which the jury may have used 
to calculate the total damages include but are not limited to the following: 
1. Michael Teuscher testified that there was actually a profit on the project after 
payment to Stevensen for the 1% fees and the land. [R. 8587, pp. 580:3-587:13; Exhibit 
97; 8020. j Without making any adjustments for anything other than dishonesty by Watts 
in presenting his accounting conclusions, Michael Teuscher testified that Stevensen was 
entitled to $262,109. [R. 8587, p. 587:4-13; Exhibit 97; 8020.] After making specific 
adjustments relative to specific categories associated with Watts' breach of fiduciary 
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duty, discussed in detail with references to the record above, the amount owed to 
Stevensen could rise to as much as $1,346,209. [R. 8587, pp. 584:3-585:14; Exhibit 97; 
8020.] The jury could have used the data provided by Mr. Teuscher to calculate its 
verdict. 
2. Deane Smith testified that the net amount owed to Stevensen was $-26,240, but 
Deane Smith and Russell Watts also testified that his calculations may have included the 
double billing of the development fee of $451,000, because it was credited to Watts' 
capital account in 2000 and then charged as an expense by Watts in 2002. [R. 8589, pp. 
1148:11-13, 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:3-1368:14.] Adjusting for that breach of fiduciary 
duty alone would have lead to a jury verdict of $199,260. Deane Smith also testified that 
he credited Watts' capital account for a $631,000 capital contribution based on paragraph 
6.1 of the Operating Agreement, even though paragraph 7.1 says that Watts is NOT to 
receive such a credit. [R. 8590, pp. 1354:10-1358:24; Exhibit 4 (page 4); 8016.] 
Correcting that error alone would have changed the net amount due to Stevensen from $-
26,240 to $289,260 by adding $315,500 to the amount due to Stevensen, according to Mr. 
Smith. [R. 8589, pp. 1151:13-1154:23.] The jury may have also concluded that even if 
Watts had been entitled to a development fee, that he did not earn the fee that he charged 
to develop the project unsuccessfully. [R. 8590, pp. 1360:10-1361:23.] The jury may 
have also made specific adjustments relative to specific categories associated with Watts' 
breach of fiduciary duty, as discussed in detail with references to the record above, to 
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calculate its verdict. [R. 8587, pp. 581:25-583:2, 584:4-19, 588:15-23, 589:14-24; 8589, 
pp. 1158:4-1159:5, 1162:7-1164:9; Exhibits 97and 762; 8020, 8041.] 
3. The jury may have determined that Watts' breaches of fiduciary duty 
contributed to a delay in the completion of construction or in the sale of the units, as 
discussed in detail with references to the record above. The delay added nothing to the 
value of the units, but did result in interest charges rising to $1,046,978. [R. 8584, pp. 
91:2-93:3, 94:18-25; 8589, p. 8589, p. 15-22; Exhibit 70 (second page), 97 (Exhibit D) 
and 762; 8019 and 8041.] The jury may have included a portion of that interest expense 
in its calculation of damages. 
4. The jury may have determined that certain expenses paid by The Club were 
improper. As an example, advertising expenses that should have been paid by the Watts 
Group totaled $374,000, legal fees that should have been paid by Watts, and expenses for 
which defendants were unable to provide any evidentiary support or other justification 
may have been included by the jury in its calculation of damages. [R. 8587, pp. 586:19-
587:3; Exhibits 83-93 and 97; 8020.] Again, advertising and Watts' legal fees did nothing 
to increase the value of the condominium units. 
5. The appraisal report by Gary Free also supports the jury's verdict. [R. Exhibit 
16; 8016.] The report states the expected sales value and time required for sales based on 
the plans represented to the appraiser. The report also warns that the market would not 
be able to absorbed higher priced condominium units. [R. 8588, pp. 793:12-794:11; 
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Exhibit 16 (page 64); 8016 and 8994.] By adhering to the plans and the construction 
budgets represented to the bank on an ongoing basis, even commencing as late as 
October 1998 when Watts knew the project was in trouble, as discussed in detail with 
references to the record above, the condominium units could have been built and sold for 
a profit. After payment to Stevensen for the land, the amount owed to Stevensen would 
have been much more than the $474,000 jury verdict. 
6. The total unpaid 1% fees was $61,548.09, a fact determined by the Trial Court 
prior to trial and unchallenged by appellant. The jury awarded a total of $474,000 to 
Stevensen 3rd East, L.C. Therefore, in addition to the $61,548.09 in 1% fees, the jury 
determined that $412,451.91 was owed. The balance owed to Stevensen is less than the 
value of the land he contributed to the Club. Pursuant to the Court Order, dated March 
16, 2005, the net value of the land was $631,000. [R. 4022-23.] $479,000 was left in 
Stevensen's capital account as the unpaid balance owed for the land. The jury awarded 
less than that amount, meaning that they determined that there was some loss on the 
project borne by Stevensen. Consequently, all of the payments due with regard to the 
$412,451.91 determined by the jury fall within the provisions of paragraph 9 of the 
March agreement, as repayment for the residual left owing on the land. 
C. THE EVIDENCE REFERENCED BY APPELLANT IN NO WAY 
UNDERMINES THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Appellant's brief acknowledges the extremely high standard required to overturn a 
verdict rendered by a jury. Nonetheless, appellant's presentation entirely violates the 
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principles articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart, supra, 2004 UT 82, 
at par 77. 
First, on pages 18-30 appellant does a meager job of marshalling evidence. 
Appellant fails to even come close to summarizing all of the testimony and exhibits upon 
which the jury's findings were based. Second, appellant fails to play the "devil's 
advocate" and even consider how the evidence in the case might actually be construed in 
a manner supporting the jury's verdict. Doing so is particularly important in this case, 
because as presented above there are so many theories upon which the jury may have 
properly based its finding liability. Third, without relating its arguments to the possible 
basis of liability, appellant begins making arguments on page 31 which fail to relate to 
the basis of the jury's verdict. Even if any of appellant's arguments were correct, it 
would not mean that the jury's verdict could be overturned. Stevensen responds to each 
of appellants arguments as follows: 
A. Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort. The jury instructions, which appellant does 
not challenge, defined fiduciary duties in terms of care, loyalty, honesty and good faith. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury deviated from those instructions 
and found Watts liable on the basis of a breach of contract theory. 
B. Appellant's argument that Stevensen was legally entitled to inspect the records 
of The Club ignores the fact that Watts Corporation, not The Club, maintained all of the 
construction records. Appellant's argument also ignores that the jury may have 
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concluded that inspection of records would not somehow have stopped Watts from 
breaching his fiduciary duties. In the first place, Watts was providing false construction 
documentation to the bank and misleading his own architect on the project. Given the 
fact that Watts immediately cut Stevensen off financially when Stevensen challenged 
Watts for the very first time in September 1999, it stands to reason that Watts wouldn't 
have acted any more fairly if Stevensen had been capable of discovering Watts' 
wrongdoing sooner. Watts had the power to act in any way he wanted from the day 
Stevensen deeded his land to The Club. 
C. Appellant grossly misstates the basis for Mr. Larsen's opinions. Appellant also 
fails to recognize that Johnathan Dazely himself testified that he was kept in the dark 
concerning budgets and changes to the construction. Dazely's testimony was that he was 
involved only for a very short period of time at the commencement of construction, 
which backed up Mr. Larsen's characterization, notwithstanding appellant's efforts to 
impeach Mr. Larsen. In addition, the jury had many reasons besides appellant's limited 
references to the testimony of Mr. Larsen to conclude that Watts breached his fiduciary 
duties. 
3. Appellant grossly misstates the basis for Mr. Larsen's opinions. While 
appellant may disagree with Mr. Larsen's opinions, appellant failed to call a construction 
expert at trial to counter those opinions. Of course, in order to disagree with Mr. 
Larsen's statements about changes leading to delay and increase costs, appellant has to 
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contradict his own trial testimony. Watts himself testified that the reason for the delay 
and increases in costs was his design changes after October 1998. There is no legal 
reason that he jury had to agree with Watts' self-serving testimony that such changes 
were prudent business decisions, particularly in light of the evidence that at least two real 
estate appraisers had warned Watts that the market would not be able to absorb higher 
priced condominiums. [R. 8588, pp. 793:12-794:11; Exhibit 16 (page 64) and 458; 8016 
and 8028.] There was also significant evidence that Watts Corporation, not merely the 
bank, was charging significant amounts of money in interest for the increased 
construction costs resulting from the changes. There were many instances in which 
Watts' actions benefitted himself to the detriment of Stevensen. Since the jury found 
Watts liable for the sum of $474,000, they obviously disagreed with appellant's 
unsubstantiated claim that Stevensen was not entitled to any further payment. In 
addition, the jury had many reasons besides appellant's limited references to the 
testimony of Mr. Larsen to conclude that Watts breached his fiduciary duties. 
E. Appellant presents one argument claiming that Watts was protected in relying 
on his lawyer as an expert, and thereby excused from the duties he owed to Stevensen, 
and another argument claiming Watts had the right to reject the advice of real estate 
appraisers as experts. It is unclear how these inconsistent arguments might be applied to 
relieve Watts of his fiduciary duties. It is unclear how appellant has reasoned that the 
jury may have made a mistake in following jury instruction nos. 51 or 52. 
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F. Appellant's expert, Mr. Smith, is the witness that identified that the $451,000 
fee in question may have been double paid to Watts. Mr. Smith testified that he deducted 
the $451,000 in his capital accounting, and that he also deducted expenses for 2002 in his 
accounting which may have included charging The Club the $451,000 fee. Nonetheless, 
there is no evidence that the jury calculated the possible double payment of the fee in 
arriving at their damages figure. Again, appellant's failure to first marshal the damages 
evidence dooms their appeal. 
4.3. Appellant's argument completely ignores the substance of the testimony 
presented by Stevensen's expert witnesses. Just because they answered one or two 
questions on cross examination by stating "I don't know," does not mean that they were 
unable to describe the support which they had for the opinions that they rendered in the 
case. If they responded to a questions with an "I don't know," one can only presume that 
their testimony was not based on the information sought by appellant's cross 
examination. Likewise, the jury listened to different witnesses for different pieces of 
evidence. They listened to Mr. Larsen for information about the construction industry 
and to Mr. Teusher for the presentation of financial data. They obtained factual 
information from fact witnesses and documents. To say that one witness did not provide 
every piece of evidence from which the case was constructed means nothing to the 
outcome of the case. 
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Appellant's argument also makes the mistake of assuming that the jury believed 
the testimony presented by appellant's witnesses at trial. Appellant's witness were all 
discredited on cross examination at trial. That is the reason that on appeal, the appellate 
courts assume that testimony contrary to the verdict was disbelieved and only look to 
ascertain whether there is evidence supporting the verdict. As discussed above, there was 
adequate evidence of proximate cause and damages presented to the jury. See argument 
V.B., above. Appellant simply fails to marshal the evidence and grapple with the real 
issues in the case. 
Appellant's issue no. 4 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact 
nor warranted by existing law. Appellant has grossly failed in its duty to marshal the 
evidence, appellant has grossly mischaracterized the foundation and conclusions of the 
expert testimony in the case, and appellant's straw man arguments grossly ignore the 
evidence upon which the jury may have ultimately based its verdict. 
VI. APPELLANT IGNORES THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HOLDING 
IN SMITH V. FAIRFAX ON THE ISSUE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
Appellant challenges the award of prejudgment interest without referencing or 
discussing the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, inc., 2003 
UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 or its progeny. The parties briefed the issue for the Trial Court, and 
appellant is aware that Smith v. Fairfax is the definitive case on point. Yet, appellants 
fail to cite or discuss Smith v. Fairfax for the apparent reason that the Utah Supreme 
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Court described the distinction between cases in which prejudgment interest is or is not 
appropriate. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the circumstances in which 
prejudgment interest should be awarded. The Utah Supreme Court explained in Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064, at 17, u*As established nearly a century 
ago in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., Utah courts award prejudgment interest in 
cases where "damages are complete" and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value." 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907); see also Cornia, 898 P.2d 
at 1387; Bjork v. April Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)." The Supreme Court 
further explained in Smith v. Fairfax, at 20: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before 
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are 
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages are 
complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with 
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or jury must 
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment in 
assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for 
elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value. 88 P. at 1007. 
Thus, we do not require that damages necessarily be liquidated, but we deny 
awards of prejudgment interest in cases where damage amounts are to be 
determined by the broad discretion of the jury. "In all personal injury cases, cases 
of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment. . . and all cases where 
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to 
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible." Id. at 1006. 
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax upheld the award of prejudgment interest 
on sums awarded by the jury which represented the jury's determination of the fair 
market value of Smith's interests in a REIT investment. The Supreme Court held that 
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where the jury had been presented with an appraisal of the value of the investment, the 
award of prejudgment interest was appropriate. The Supreme Court explained: 
The fact that the parties disputed the value of the property at trial does not change 
our conclusion that the jury's determination of the property's value was 
"ascertained . . . in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards 
of value." Fell 88 P. at 1007. Therefore, we uphold the trial court's decision to 
award prejudgment interest. 
Id. at 23. 
An award of prejudgment interest in the present case is appropriate for the same 
reasons. Two economic experts provided testimony concerning damages to the jury. 
Both experts were CPAs and applied generally accepted accounting principles, which 
reflect "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." Both CPAs presented the 
exact amount of revenue actually generated by the business activity of The Club, as well 
as the exact amount of expenses paid by The Club to Watts, his companies, and third 
parties. The jury was given only the limited decision to determine which specific items 
of expense were unjustified under the circumstances. The jury used the simple method of 
additional and subtraction of expenditures set forth in the evidence to arrive at a damages 
figure. Both Smith v. Fairfax Realty and the present case involved a dispute about the 
amount of damages, with calculations of damages offered by financial experts. The 
Supreme Court held that where damages are capable of presentation by experts based on 
financial data, the requirement established by Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P. 
1003, 1007 (Utah 1907) that damages can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and 
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known standards of value" is met. Certainly, if the appraisal evidence in Smith v. Fairfax 
Realty meets the standard, then using exact financial entries from the books of the 
company meets the standard in the present case. 
Damages which cannot be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value" are those associated with "personal injury cases, cases of death by 
wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment . . ." Smith v. Fairfax, at 20; Fell v. 
Union Pacific Railway Co., at 1006. Appellant cites Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co. 
and cases such as personal injury cases and cases in which the issue was something akin 
to "cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market prices ...v 
Obviously, a personal injury case will not produce a holding instructive to a case in 
which damages are based purely on financial records. 
It is unnecessary for purposes of prejudgment interest to know which particular 
expense the jury added or subtracted to arrive at their verdict. There were no broken 
bones or intangible damages involved. Appellant fails to reference a single case in which 
prejudgment interest was disallowed on the basis of calculations originating with the 
actual accounting records of a company. In citing Iron Head Construction, Inc. v. 
Gurney, 2008 UT App 1, 176 P.3d 453, appellant also seems to have ignored the entire 
context in which prejudgment interest was upheld with respect to a settlement of both 
equitable and contractual claims. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Iron Head, at 
par. 20, the very arguments being made by appellants in this case were rejected in both 
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Smith v. Fairfax and in Bennett v. Huish, 2007 Utah App. 19, at par. 45. Appellant also 
cites Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Mgmt., 2005 Utah App. 430, 124 P.3d 269, but fails to 
inform this Court that Orlob also upheld the award of prejudgment interest, rejecting 
arguments similar to those of the appellant in the present case. 
In order to deter a breach of fiduciary duty, Courts have uniformly held that the 
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on damages associated with a claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty. 59A Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, Section 360, 658 (2003). The Utah 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax chose not to determine whether or not Utah would 
follow the same holding, because it upheld the award of prejudgment interest on the 
grounds stated above. Nonetheless, the Smith v. Fairfax case implies that such a holding 
might very well be adopted for breach of fiduciary duty cases in Utah in which the Fell 
standard did not apply. Smith v. Fairfax, supra, at 18-19 (Affirming trial court's award of 
prejudgment interest on other grounds, making it unnecessary to consider whether or not 
Utah should follow other states in awarding prejudgment interest in all cases of breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
The rationale for awarding prejudgment interest in situations involving breach of 
fiduciary duty is to remove the incentive for a fiduciary to enjoy a windfall by delaying 
payment to the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court 
stated, "In situations such as the instant one involving the breach of fiduciary duty, the 
law does not permit defendants to obtain the beneficial use of plaintiff s funds at no cost 
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to the wrong doer, and in determining the appropriate damages in such case. "So focused 
on making the plaintiff whole by placing him in a posture which assumes that he had the 
opportunity to utilize his funds in a reasonable manner." In re Estate of Wernicke 502 
N.E. 2d 1146, 1154 (111. App. 1986). In a companion case, the Illinois Supreme Court 
further stated, "The rationale underline an equitable award of prejudgment interest in a 
case involving a breach of fiduciary duty is to make the injured party complete by forcing 
the fiduciary to account for profits and interest he gained of the use of the injured parties' 
money. The injured party is thus compensated for any economic loss occasioned by the 
inability to use his money. Prejudgment interest in this context acts as a concept of 
fairness and equity, and not as a sanction against the defendant. Fundamental principles 
of damages and compensation dictate that when money has been wrongfully withheld 
that it can receive interest for the wrongdoer's retention of his money." In re Estate of 
Wernicke 535 N.E. 2d 876, 888 (111. 1989). Other Courts are in accord. See Rolf v. 
Blythe, Eastman Pillion & Co., Inc. 637 F.2d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 1980) ("An award of 
prejudgment interest is in the first instance, compensatory, and is customary in cases 
involving breach of fiduciary duty."); Jefferson Natl. Bank of Miami Beach v. Central 
Natl. Bank in Chicago, 700 F.2d 1143, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983) (Holding in breach of 
fiduciary duty case that "Trustee who commits a breach of trust and incurs liability for a 
certain amount of money and the loss of income thereon is properly accountable not only 
for the return of the money but also interest actually received by him during that 
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period."); In re Estate of Lash, 747 A.2d 327, 335 (N.J. Sup. 2000) Applying the rule that 
i n an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the available remedies include a surcharge in 
the amount of misappropriated funds plus prejudgment interest."); McDermott v. Party 
City Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 612, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (''prejudgment interest is available 
for awards of breach of fiduciary duty."); Michaelson v. Hamada, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 
353 (Cal. A 1994) (Where defendant breached fiduciary duty, citing cases confirming 
that an award of compound interest is appropriate in this type of case.); Ryan v. City of 
Chicago, 654 N.E. 2d 483, 486, 489 (111. App. 1995) (Awarding compound interest on a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, where "compound interest was required in order to make 
full, equitable restitution" under pension code). Guardianship of Chandos, 504 P.2d 524 
(Ariz. App. 1972). 
Were the calculation of interest in the present case to fall outside of the Fell 
standard for any reason, the equities in this case would clearly dictate that interest be 
awarded. The jury found that Watts was guilty of not mere negligence in violating his 
fiduciary duties, but that his violation rose to a level of gross negligence and/or willful 
misconduct. It would be patently unjust to allow Watts the free use of money owed to 
Stevensen for the past 9 years, in light of the degree of Mr. Watts' wrongdoing and the 
impact it has had on Stevensen and its members. 
Appellant's issue no. 5 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact 
nor warranted by existing law. Because appellant has knowingly omitted a discussion of 
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Smith v. Fairfax and has cited both Iron Head and Orlob in his brief, without informing 
this Court of their actual holdings or making any attempt to distinguish them, this Court 
should conclude that the appeal is not made in good faith and oral argument should not be 
permitted. 
VII. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED REFLECTS A 
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the 
appropriate amount of attorney's fees awarded. The Trial Court had no obligation to 
consider appellants arguments, because appellant failed to make any objection as to the 
amount of the fees prior to the time of hearing on the motion in question. Stevensen 
submitted his first affidavit of costs, expenses and attorney fees, including a full detailed 
breakdown of the work performed, the dates, the hourly rate, and so forth on February 16, 
2007. [R. 8269-91.] Appellants did not make any objection to the amount of attorney 
fees claimed in their memorandum in opposition, dated March 1, 2007. [R. 8316-28.] A 
hearing on the matter was held April 30, 2007. [R. 8417, 8583, p. 1-67.] The Trial Court 
ruled in favor of Stevensen and directed counsel for Stevensen to prepare an order based 
on the successful motion. [R. 8417, 8583, p. 66:18-67:5.] Appellant did not file its first 
objection to the amount of fees until May 7, 2007. [R.8423-8425.] The Trial Court 
acknowledge that fact in the hearing held July 5, 2007. [R. 8583, pp.79:25-80:2, 87:12-
22.] And appellant acknowledged the failure. [R. 8583, p. 85:14-18.] 
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Notwithstanding appellant's failure, the Trial Court received supplemental 
briefing and scheduled further oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the 
basis of its determination. Hearings were held on July 5, 2007 and August 13, 2007. [R. 
8583, p. 68-134.] In response to the request of the Trial Court, Stevensen submitted a 
second affidavit containing a detailed analysis of time spent on various activities such as 
communicating with clients, communicating with opposing counsel, discovery, legal 
research, successful motions, unsuccessful motions, trial preparation and trial, and post 
trial motions. [R. 8487-8516.] The affidavit indicated that fewer than 10 hours were 
allocated to a party other that appellant, and even described Stevensen's position as to 
those hours that might be the subject of some dispute by appellant, including addressing 
unsuccessful claims. [R. 8489-90.] These details were then discussed again at the 
hearing held August 13,2007. [R. 8583, p. 102:24-110:24, 112:4-118:6, 118:10-119:17, 
123:5-124:19.] The Trial Court then made a detailed ruling as to the factors considered, 
and reduced the award of attorney fees from $261,320 requested to $226,400 awarded. 
[R. 8583, p. 125:24-128:13.] Appellant's claim that the Trial Court did not undertake 
such a process is frivolous as a matter of law. 
The amount of an award of attorneys fees is within the broad discretion of the trial 
Court. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (fee awarded by trial court 
will not be disturbed absent "showing of patent error or clear abuse of discretion"); 
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978) (fee awarded by trial court will 
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not be disturbed "in the absence of patent error or clear abuse of discretion"); Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (trial court to weigh large variety of 
factors in determining a reasonable fee);. Fundamental considerations include: 
The difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the 
case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Id. at 989. Considerations may also include the legal work actually performed, the 
portion of the work reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, and other 
circumstances, such as factors listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ld- at 
990. 
What constitutes adequate evidentiary support for a request for attorneys fees was 
described in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268-70 (Utah 1992) as hours 
spent on the case, the hourly rate charged for those hours, the usual and customary rates 
for such work, and some allocation of the hours relative to the underlying claims and the 
parties involved. Although no request was made by appellant in this case, an opposing 
party may request access to supporting documents for purposes of contesting the 
evidence presented. Id. at 266. Appellant also cites Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1998) for the same proposition. Nonetheless, in Foote, the trial court failed to undertake 
an analysis of the reasonableness of the fees requested. Id. at 56. Similarly, in 
Cottonwood Mall Co., the plaintiffs affidavit failed to even delineate basic information 
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such as the work performed, the billing rate or the hours spent. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. 
Sine, 830 P.2d at 269. 
The fee award can also be upheld based on evidence that there was a contingency 
fee arrangement. [R. 8490.] The Utah Supreme Court in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996) held that attorneys fees were foreseeable, and found that 
the findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous in failing to recognize the likelihood 
that an attorney would be hired on a contingency fee basis. Id. at 468. 
In the present case, Stevensen provided a very detailed breakdown of the attorney 
fees requested, addressing the elements named by each of the cases cited. The Trial 
Court expressly found that it had adequate evidence before it to fully evaluate the 
appropriate amount of the attorney fee to be awarded, including but not limited to an 
evaluation of successful claims, unsuccessful claims, the work performed, the hourly rate 
and its reasonableness for this type of litigation in Salt Lake County. In making its 
ruling, the Trial Court commented on its familiarity with the case, its considerable 
complexity, the work necessary to present the case in a well organized and expert fashion 
to the jury, and the litigation process need to bring the case to that point. The Trial Court 
made a determination to reduce the fee requested by approximately $35,000 based on its 
evaluation of what was reasonable and necessary relative to the results achieved. The 
Trial Court stated that it did not rely on the contingency fee arrangement in evidence. 
Since the affidavit and the further evidence on the record and available to the Trial Court 
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were sufficient to allow the Trial Court to evaluate all of the essential factors for 
determination of a reasonable attorney fee, appellant's challenge to the amount solely on 
the basis of an inadequate affidavit is not made in good faith. Appellant appears to 
simply be making the same arguments to this Court which it argued unsuccessfully to the 
Trial Court, without recognizing that this Court will not simply substitute its judgment for 
that of the Trial Court absent a "showing of patent error or clear abuse of discretion." 
Appellant's issue no. 6 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact 
nor warranted by existing law. Stevensen's affidavit supporting its motion for fees, 
combined with the extensive briefing, oral argument and the familiarity of the Trial Court 
were adequate as a matter of law. Appellant's contention that the Trial Court lacked the 
information necessary to determine the appropriate amount of fees is not made in good 
faith and oral argument is unwarranted. 
VIII. THE COSTS AWARDED REFLECT A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION. 
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the 
appropriate amount of costs awarded. Again, the Trial Court received extensive briefing 
and oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the basis of its determination. 
Appellant's challenge is frivolous, because the law does not permit parties to ask the 
Appellate Courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the Trial Court where there 
is an adequate basis for the Trial Court's decision. Appellant has also failed to marshal 
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the evidence associated with the Trial Court's decision to award certain expenses of 
litigation as consequential damages, rather than as taxable costs. 
Stevensen is entitled to its taxable costs, as provided by Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 54. The determination of taxable costs is discretionary with the Trial 
Court, subject to the Appellate Court's review for an abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 
16 P.3 549, 551 (Utah 2000); Morgan v. Morgan, 795.P.2d 684, 686 (Utah App. 1990). 
Filing fees, witness fees, and deposition costs constitute the categories of ordinary taxable 
costs. Id. at 686-87. Deposition costs are recoverable, even if not used in the course of 
trial, if the Trial Court believes the depositions were "taken in good faith and, in light of 
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the 
case." Young v. State, supra, at 551. The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the 
cost of depositions are generally allowed when reasonably necessary when "the 
development of the case is of such a complex nature that discovery cannot be 
accomplished through the less expensive method of interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, and requests for production of documents." Highland Const. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).9 
9
 Appellant refers to Lloyds Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 
512 (1988) and John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978), in which 
the Utah Supreme Court made the same or similar statements in the course of upholding 
the trial court's decision not to award deposition fees. The holdings, thus, stand for the 
proposition that awarding deposition costs is discretionary with the trial court on the basis 
of the factors articulated. 
63 
In the present case, Stevensen incurred taxable costs in this matter consisting of 
the filing fee of $170.00, witness fees of $36.50, and deposition costs of $2,187.20. The 
Trial Court expressly found that such costs were reasonable and necessary to the present 
litigation. The witness fees were actually those paid to the appellant Watts himself for 
the trial that went forward, as well as one of the prior scheduled trials. The deposition 
costs included the depositions of Ted Stevensen ($280.40) and Watts ($1,616.75) which 
were used repeatedly during trial and were essential to the case, as well as Bryan Todd 
($290.05). While Bryan Todd did not appear as a witness at trial, his deposition was 
taken in good faith and was essential to discovery concerning the meaning of the 
Operating Agreement he drafted for the parties and the work he did relative to the land 
contributed by Stevensen to the Club, which were subjects of considerable testimony at 
trial. Given the considerable complexity of the case, there is no way that the case could 
have been prepared for trial without the three depositions merely by using interrogatories 
or other written discovery methods. For only three depositions to be taken in a case as 
complicated as the present case, it could reasonably be concluded by the Trial Court that 
each of the depositions was taken in good faith and was essential to the development and 
presentation of the case. It should be apparent that the parties took only those depositions 
that were essential. The Trial Court followed the holding in Young v. State and found 
that said depositions were "taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances. 
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appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the case." The Trial 
Court properly exercised its discretion in awarding taxable costs. 
In the present case, the Trial Court also awarded expert witness fees, copy 
expenses, and service of process fees as reasonably foreseeable consequential damages, 
not as taxable costs. [R. 8560-61.] The only issue for appeal is whether expenses that 
were not taxable costs can be awarded as consequential damages. If there is any legal 
basis, then the decision of the Trial Court and the amount of expenses awarded must be 
upheld. To answer the question of whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to expenses as 
consequential damages, the Court must ask the same question that was posed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the cases of Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 
(Utah 1996), Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985), Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992), and Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah 1958). The question is 
whether such expenses are consequential damages arising from defendant Watts' breach 
of fiduciary duty which were ^reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." See Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co., at 468; Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, at 801. 
Watts did have a contract to act as the manage of The Club. As in Heslop v. Bank 
of Utah, the employment contract was an implied-in-fact contract. Watts was appointed 
as the manager by the Operating Agreement of The Club. Watts was aware of the 
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appointment, accepted the appointment and performed the duties of the manager under an 
implied-in-fact employment contract. It was foreseeable at the time the employment of 
Watts as the manager of The Club arose that if he breached his fiduciary duties that he 
owed as the manager of The Club, plaintiff would necessarily bring a legal action and 
incur attorney fees and expenses in the course of the litigation. The Trial Court expressly 
found that this was the case. [R. 8583, pp. 61:12-62:18, 65:5-20, 66:23-67:3.] Appellant 
cites Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equipment, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446, par. 21, 
147 P.3d 951 for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court only allows attorneys fees 
as consequential damages in limited cases where there is a contract. Appellant's 
argument ignores the fact that there was a written contract in the form of the operating 
agreement of The Club which governed Watts' employment and duties as the manager of 
The Club, and that Watts further had an implied-in-fact contract with fiduciary duties 
running to Stevensen. In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, the employment contract was an 
implied-in-fact contract. 
Of course, since appellant has not marshaled the evidence concerning Watts 
employment by The Club as the manager and his employment by Watts Corporation as 
the contractor, and how he breached his fiduciary duties, appellant has failed to provide 
this Court with a context to evaluate the decision that the Trial Court made in finding that 
Stevensen was entitled to the expenses in question as consequential damages under the 
unique circumstances of this case. 
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The present case also reflects the equities in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co. 
and Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. As with an insurer's breach of the express or 
implied terms of an insurance contract, it is reasonably foreseeable that legal action will 
result when a manager acts with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the breach of 
the fiduciary duties he owes in a closely held company such as The Club. Watts was 
aware that plaintiff was dependant upon his good faith, conscientious performance of his 
duties. Watts was aware of the large volume of documents involved in the construction 
of the Club condominiums and the necessity for those documents to be copied an 
analyzed by experts in order to ascertain what he had done during the course of 
construction. All of the parties recognized the complexity of the case and worked 
diligently to simplify matters as much as possible for presentation to the jury in the 
course of 7 days. As the above-cited testimony of Lynn Larsen, plaintiffs construction 
expert, and Johnathan Dazely, defendants' architect, brought out, Watts was the only 
person in possession of the information concerning the constantly changing costs of the 
construction project. Rather than having the architect review construction invoices 
during the course of construction, as required by the industry standards, Watts chose to 
keep the architect uniformed about the budget while Watts purported to fill the role of the 
architect himself. The fact that Watts was the sole repository of all construction cost 
information made it possible for him to conceal cost information, which necessarily 
required his deposition, considerable document discovery, and the use of experts to 
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analyze the construction process and the financial records in the case. Because the 
attorney fees and expenses of litigation were the foreseeable consequences of Watts' 
action, they should be awarded as consequential damages. 
Other states have specifically ruled that attorneys fees are recoverable in cases of 
breach of fiduciary duty. Allard v. First Interstate Bank of Washington, 768 P.2d 998, 
1001 (Wash. 1989); Pauley v. Gilbert, 582 S.E.2d 208, 217 (W.Va. 1999). Although a 
question of first impression in Utah, it is likely that Utah will follow this rule should the 
appropriate case arise. The present case illustrates the importance of following such a 
course in the state of Utah. Watts was in a position of trust and a position in which he 
was uniquely qualified and able to take advantage of the naivety of Stevensen, with its 
principle being a man in his 70s without the extensive real estate development experience 
that Watts had. In addition to acting as the manager of the company, Watts controlled all 
elements of the development and construction. He was the president of the construction 
company and was on site several times each week. He controlled all of the construction 
records through his construction company (not through The Club where they would be 
available for inspection by Stevensen as appellant implies). He dismissed the architect 
from the job shortly before changing course to take the project millions of dollars over 
budget in order to eliminate any supervision. He then willfully, or at least with gross 
negligence, betrayed that trust and benefited himself to the detriment of Stevensen. In 
this unique position, it is only the power of the courts which will prevent men like Watts 
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from intentionally abusing their position for their own profit at the expense of others. 
Where the expenses of litigation are foreseeable consequences of a breach of fiduciary 
duty, they must be awarded, not in any punitive way but in recognition that such 
expenses are part of the damage caused by dishonesty in business. 
IX. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
WITHOUT HEARING AND FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED, 
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE FRIVOLOUS. 
A frivolous appeal uis one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b). 
In the present case, appellant seeks to characterize numerous elements of the 
underlying litigation in a manner contrary to the record. While appellant may consider its 
characterization as a function of "advocacy," such an approach ignores the legal standard 
upon which such an appeal must be based. Appellant must recognize that in order to 
prevail on the appeal of a jury's findings, all facts must be construed in support of the 
verdict. In order to challenge matters within the discretion of the Trial Court, an 
appellant must show a clear abuse of discretion. In challenging the Trial Court's 
decisions on issues of law, an appellant must show that the alleged error altered the 
outcome of the case. Only after presenting the record to the appellate court in that light 
can the appellant advocate that the evidence is insufficient to support the actions of the 
Trial Court or the findings of the jury. Ignoring evidence in the record is not a proper 
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approach to advocacy. Instead, ignoring evidence in the record gives rise to an appeal 
"not grounded in fact." Likewise, the appellants failure to transcribe necessary pretrial 
hearings gives rise to an appeal "not grounded in fact" because of the missing record In 
this case, appellant's arguments are not grounded in fact, nor are they warranted by 
existing law. 
Stevensen requests an award of attorney's fees incurred in responding to the 
frivolous appeal in this action, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. 
Stevensen further requests that the appeal in this action be dismissed without hearing, in 
order to avoid further unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee Stevensen respectfully requests that the appeal in this matter be 
dismissed without hearing, based on appellant's failure to marshal the relevant evidence, 
failure to properly address applicable case law, and lack of good faith in bringing the 
present appeal. Stevensen further requests an award of his costs and attorneys fees 
incurred herein, on the basis that the appeal is frivolous, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. 
ADDENDUM 
Any references to addendum herein are references to the addendum supplied by 
appellant. No further addendum is required. 
DATED this 5 £ day of October, 2008. 
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